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The Islamic macroeconomic model: 
How to apply it 
Mabid Ali Al-Jarhi 
Introduction 
Islamic economic macro models can be broadly divided into two categories. Both categories ignore the 
neoclassical microfoundations based on the utility-maximizing individual, the profit-maximizing firm, the typical 
macroeconomic agent, and the different versions of strict rationality attached to an all-knowing decision-making 
unit. Both approaches give due attention to the importance of equity and the role of Zakah and Awqaf in providing 
a significant share of public services. 
The first category was inspired by Mannan (1970), Siddiqui (1981, 2006), and Chapra (1985, 1996) and elaborated 
by Khan and Mirakhor (1994) and Iqbal and Mirakhor (2011), in addition to Mirakhor and Zaidi (2007). This profit 
and loss sharing (PLS) approach implicitly assumes a pure equity-based system and draws important conclusions 
about its efficiency, equilibrium, and stability. Meanwhile, it ignores the institutional details of the monetary and 
financial structure. When discussing monetary policy, the traditional policy tools are usually listed, with the 
exception of those that use the rate of interest. The neoclassical straightjacketing into a stable equilibrium 
remains. The trouble with this category is their insistence on the pure equity model as a representative of the 
Islamic macro model. At an early stage, many have thought that to be a first approximation. Yet, the tendency has 
persisted from 1970 to the current century. Pure equity is not a correct characterization of an Islamic economic 
system. Economywide optimization would require a mix of equity and debt finance. The latter has been provided 
through several-sale finance contracts. 
The second category proposes a detailed institutional structure of the monetary or financial sector of an Islamic 
economic system. This structure has distinctive features concerning money creation and finance allocation. 
Furthermore, the money market contains the necessary instruments for the anchor and conduct of monetary 
policy. In other words, the rules of Shari’ah concerning economic behavior have been translated into a behavioral 
structure attached to an institutional framework. This category has been offered by Al-Jarhi (1981, 1983) with 
several consequent modifications and improvements. Most importantly, it started with a Hicksian IS-LM 1  
structure, which is neoclassical. The author has later decided to switch to a disequilibrium structure. 
 
1   Hicks (1937) introduced a neoclassical model, which he claimed to be of Keynes. The IS curve represents the 
saving-investment equilibrium, while the LM curve represented the demand for and the supply of money 
equilbrium. The intersection of both schedules represents the neoclassical stable full employment equilibrium. It 
became famous as the IS-LM model. Hicks (1980) later admitted that his model was not that of Keynes but of 
the neoclassics. 
This chapter describes the Islamic macroeconomic model according to Al-Jarhi’s approach. It provides 
recommendations on applying this model to the macroeconomy for economic development and stabilization 
purposes. In this regard, the chapter considers gradualism and institutional competition as the two driving forces 
behind the implementation. As to the latter, the legal and regulatory environment is continuously modified to 
provide both conventional and Islamic economic institutions working side by side to have an equal opportunity to 
operate, leaving the competition to have the final say for the public to judge the usefulness of each. 
How money is created 
Issuing money 
In the conventional monetary model, money is created in the form of credit balances to be lent to the treasury as 
well as to banks. The treasury uses these balances to cover the deficit in the government budget. Banks use the 
balances as reserves to cover their (interest-based) lending to the public. 
Under the fractional reserve system, the neoclassicists claim that banks create money 
as a multiple of reserves, which are initially issued by the central bank in the form of 
the monetary base. Banks allegedly issue money as multiple reserves in the form of 
derivative deposits through lending to the public. The maximum amount of money 
issued would be equal to the monetary base multiplied by the money multiplier, which 
would be equal to the reciprocal of the required reserve ratio. 
Some theorists, however, argue that banks do not wait for the central banks to issue the monetary base. They 
instead take the initiative to make loans and create derivative deposits, then rush to the central bank to cover 
their reserve positions. The central bank finds itself, at least in the short run, forced to oblige (Moore, 2001). This 
opinion later found convincing empirical support (Kydland and Prescott, 1990). This means that the concept of 
the money multiplier has been a myth, with no factual support. At any rate, money in a conventional economy is 
issued on a lending basis. What then is the basis for issuing money in an Islamic economic system? 
Before we answer this question, it is important to note that the misunderstanding regarding the money multiplier 
has led to theories that assume the homogeneity of money, which ends up claiming that money is only a veil, as 
changes in its rate of growth would only affect prices, leaving real variables unchanged. 
Furthermore, the application of fractional reserves has weakened the grip of the central bank on the money 
supply, as most of the money supply would be issued by banks in a multiple of the monetary base. It also allowed 
banks to gain wealth at the expense of the public as they lend money to the public at a rate of interest, while the 
public is the only party that can be credited with giving the money its quality as money, through bestowing on it 
their general acceptance. Moreover, the use of the required reserve ratio as a tool of monetary policy appears to 
be counterproductive, as any change in the ratio would produce multiple changes in the money supply, 
threatening to make the monetary policy a source of instability. 
Based on these three reasons, Al-Jarhi’s model (Al-Jarhi, 1981, 1983) insists on the application of total reserves to 
provide the central bank with absolute power to control the money supply, to prevent the wealth redistribution 
in favor of banks’ shareholders, and to do away with a tool of monetary policy that mostly led to instability. 
In Al-Jarhi’s model, money is created as credit balances to be credited to the central bank investment accounts 
with banks under the name of central bank deposits or central deposits, CDs for short. They are placed in Islamic 
banks based on the Mudaraba contract. The newly issued money would be allocated to Islamic banks according 
to their record of profitability and safety. Issuing and retiring new money by adding or subtracting from CDs would 
be the first and utmost tool to manage the money supply 
To assist in managing and fine-tuning the rate of monetary expansion, the central bank issues monetary 
instruments called central deposit certificates, CDCs, which would be offered to banks, financial institutions, and 
the public. Their proceeds are added to CDs and similarly allocated among banks. 
The CDCs represent an undivided common share in the Mudaraba pool of assets created by banks through their 
financing provided to the household and business sectors, using Islamic finance products. Such products are based 
on Islamic finance contracts that range from a partnership in a product, partnership in profit, investment agency, 
and Ijarah, as well as sale finance that includes deferred-payment sale and deferred delivery sale. 
The CDCs stand to compete with other investments, like shares, fund certificates, and Sukuk. However, it is 
distinguished by being the lowest-risk monetary asset, thanks to the automatic diversification by the central bank, 
who knows the most about its member banks.2 Therefore, on the liquidity scale, it stands as the nearest asset to 
money in liquidity, while it pays a rate of return that is equal to the average of returns on all assets included in the 
Mudaraba pools of all banks in the economy3. 
Estimating the real rate of growth: why?  
We start with a relatively stable state of (disequilibrium) prices, where pressures of excess demands or supplies 
are in a state of moderation, that is, with moderate pressure on prices towards upward and downward 
movements to their nearest disequilibrium values. Meanwhile, markets would be characterized by a degree of 
monopolistic competition, where markets are generally fragmented by brand names, geographic locations, and 
related price-searching tactics on the sides of both buyers and sellers. 
Prices in such an environment vary with the degree of price differentiation related to the promotion and 
advertisement activities and the related services provided by sellers. Traders, meanwhile, stay busy with price 
searching in a way that makes it impossible for any market to reach a stable equilibrium, due to the interactions 
(emergent or strategic behavior) between traders in addition to the information-cost differential between 
markets. This, we argue, is the real state that is far removed from the neoclassical attachment to stable equilibria, 
which increasingly appears as a fanciful idea. 
In this disequilibrium mode, the movement towards or away from equilibrium would become vigorous or weaker 
depending on the extent of excess demands and supplies in markets and the degree of awareness among traders 
with of these excesses as well as their expectations about their effects. Some would expect price increases and 
therefore continue buying. Some others would expect price declines and therefore go for selling. In such an 
environment of uncertainty, expectations are mostly disappointed. Prices would thus continue to approach or go 
further from equilibrium, which continues to give rise to traders’ interaction or emergent behavior. 
 
2 Despite the fact that the Mudaraba contract suffers from information asymmetry, the central bank supervisory role over 
banks enables it to monitor banks continuously, which renders information asymmetry nil. 
3 Such would be a weighted average. 
In this economy, a higher rate of monetary expansion is followed by excess demands for all commodities to varying 
degrees. This leads firms to seek financing to provide more supplies. The fact that banks, using Islamic modes of 
finance without resorting to ruses, provide finance either to suppliers alone or demanders and suppliers together 
would closely connect the finance sector with the real sector, which is mostly disconnected in a market economy. 
It would attenuate price rises and allow the finance sector to positively influence the speed of adjustments in 
commodity markets. 
Excess supplies would tend to go down, depending on the extent of monetary expansion and the responsiveness 
of supply to increased availability of financing. What stands between the economy and equilibrium is the state of 
uncertainty, which caused producers to raise their supply by an amount that is always significantly or slightly 
below or above what is needed to reach equilibrium. 
Let us remember that we have started with an economy in disequilibrium, and then the emergent behavior got 
hotter with the increase in monetary expansion. Because of the initial and following conditions, the relationship 
between monetary expansion and price stability remains central. To the extent that monetary expansion remains 
within the limits of economic growth, excess supplies dominate the scene, keeping disequilibrium prices calm. 
Once monetary expansion exceeds the limits of economic growth, excess demands dominate, forcing prices out 
of control. Therefore, the monetary authority must monitor the relationship between monetary expansion and 
economic growth for the benefit of reaching price stability. 
If the increase in the monetary expansion is far below economic growth, excess demand would be modest, and 
so would their effect on the speeds of adjustment and price levels. The opposite is also true. If the increase in 
monetary expansion exceeds economic growth, excess demands would be proportionately higher and the 
increase in prices would be larger. 
While we make no claims to a perfect or competitive asset market, we can nonetheless claim that there would be 
some reasonable degree of general awareness among investors regarding the trade-offs between different 
investments (stocks, Sukuk, fund shares, investment deposits in different banks, and direct investment). 
We would not, therefore, indulge in making assumptions parallel to those made by the “efficient market 
hypothesis”. Some of those assumptions can be mentioned here as examples. First, the collective expectations of 
stock market investors are accurate predictions of companies’ prospects. Second, share prices fully reflect all 
information pertinent to the prospects of traded companies. Third, changes in share prices are due to changes in 
information relevant to prospects. Such assumptions would make all knowledgeable prophets out of investors 
and provide a baseless rationalization for a theory that claims that financial markets are stable and not subject to 
fluctuations, which is contrary to reality (Keen, 2011). 
Such general awareness would motivate investors to take the existence of the trade-offs as much as possible in 
their investment decision. This implies no claim to their considering all possible alternatives or being rational in 
the calculative sense. 
Due to extremely curtailed speculations, for reasons be explained later, the absence of hoarding puts more steam 
in increasing the commodity supplies. However, this process will continue to work, as long as monetary expansion 
stays within the requirements of real growth. 
The continuous interaction among investors, based on bounded rationality, supported by a state of limited 
awareness of trade-offs between assets, will lead the rate of return on CDCs, or RCDC, to approach the average 
rate of return on national wealth4. The difference would be the market assessment of the risk premium that CDCs 
enjoy, due to the nature of their issuer and the high diversification of the issuer’s portfolio5. 
The central bank would therefore have two options concerning anchoring monetary policy. The first is to use the 
rate of return on CDCs, or the RCDC, as a presumed approximation of the real rate of growth. The second is to 
attempt to estimate the real rate of growth using the RCDC itself. With either option, the central bank has to 
monitor inflation, as it would deliver the final say on whether the rate of monetary growth is overshooting or 
undershooting real growth requirements. 
How the real rate of growth would be estimated, based on the RCDC, is the next step. Being aware of the risk 
premium, the central bank can estimate the rate of growth of the economy as equal to the RCDC plus an estimated 
risk premium that changes from time to time, depending upon the state of expectations about 
i the performance of the real sector, 
ii its fundamentals, and 
iii the attitude of traders in the financial market. 
Notably, the financial market in this model has a much smaller amount of speculative trading, defined as trading 
based on price expectations and/or the rate of return of the financial instruments. The reason is that financial-
market trading cannot be financed. This is a prohibition that Al-Jarhi adds to his model, based on the fact that 
finance of speculation is more like a Ponzi scheme.  Admittedly, this would not remove all speculative trading but 
would reduce it much below what is familiar in contemporary financial markets. Based on this, the real rate of 
growth would be equal to the RCDC plus some nonlinear function of the difference between the rate of return on 
shares (possibly estimated by the rate of growth in some stock market index) and the RCDC. 
Monetary management 
Islamic finance reform 
Islamic finance has succumbed to the use of ruses to mimic conventional finance. While Islamic finance is costly 
to document and implement, conventional finance is simpler and less costly. The benefits of Islamic finance are 
significant, but they tend to be external macroeconomic benefits that cannot be internalized by a single bank. 
Naturally, in the absence of regulatory discipline, due to the disinterest of monetary authorities, Islamic finance 
has spent much effort in structuring products that have the Islamic garb while being conventional in essence. No 
 
4 Let us remember that central deposit certificates, CDCs, are titles to assets created through investment (not loans) by banks, 
which pays the central bank a rate of return every financial period. The central bank in return pays CDCs holders the average 
of the same return after keeping its profit share. The CDC rate of return, RCDC, is the average rate of return on all central 
bank deposits, CDCs, whether emanating from a deliberate change in the money supply or through sale of CDC’s in the open 
market. 
5 Central deposits are invested in all areas of the real sector, corporate and noncorporate, listed and unlisted. Therefore, they 
carry a degree of diversification that has a wider range than placing funds in the portfolio of a financial market index or any 
other combination of listed companies. 
economy can therefore benefit from adopting an Islamic finance camouflage for conventional finance. Reform 
must be done head-on before the economy can make use of the benefits of Islamic finance (Al-Jarhi, 2016; 2017d). 
The RCDC and the rate of real growth 
The rate of return on CDCs or the RCDC is a market-determined measure of investment profitability (or the rate 
of growth of wealth) in a large section of the economy. This makes it rather useful in estimating an approximation 
of the real rate of growth for the whole economy. Once the central bank has a money-market determined 
indicator that can be used to estimate the real rate of growth, the latter would become an ideal anchor for 
monetary policy. Whether the supply of money should be changed and by how much can be figured out through 
comparing the RCDC and the rate of inflation. As inflation (as well as deflation) is known to have serious efficiency 
and redistributional drawbacks. To avoid them, the monetary authority must seek absolute price stability. Initially, 
the central bank would anchor the rate of growth of money to the RCDC. To the extent that there is no inflation 
or deflation, such policy should be judged successful. 
We assert that the real rate of growth is a function of the RCDC, particularly in the case of no inflation or deflation. 
However, this must be subject to some reservations. First, the CDC trading in the money market would produce a 
series of disequilibrium prices over time. Traders would be uncertain about prices. They would take the present 
as a guide to the future, in the way Keynes introduced uncertainty into his model. In contrast with Keynes’ model, 
in an Islamic economy, those who would wish to speculate at a wider scale would not be financed for this purpose, 
as the financing of trading in financial instruments would be prohibited. The tendency of trying to predict where 
the trading herd is heading would not find the financing support to make it profitable to seasoned traders. The 
mere reliance on current conditions and the information regarding economic fundamentals would settle the 
trading price of CDCs, and consequently its rate of return, close to but never at its equilibrium level. 
This provides the central bank some guidance to the state of economic growth that can be sharpened by looking 
at the inflation rate. The extent to which inflation is close to zero indicates how closely the central bank estimate 
of the rate of growth, based on the RCDC, approximates its actual value. Such comparisons should help the central 
bank fine-tune the rate of monetary expansion to reach two objectives: (i) provide the monetary requirements 
for growth and (ii) maintain price stability. 
It is therefore important that Islamic banks do not provide any finance to speculators6. This would increase the 
usefulness of the RCDC to be used in estimating an approximate rate of growth. Moreover, it facilitates monetary 
management by monitoring the rate of inflation to gauge monetary expansion to price stability. 
We have argued that the RCDC can be a base for estimating real growth, provided that financing of trading in the 
financial market is not available. The value of the RCDC will not be the same as the value of the real rate of growth, 
except under very restrictive assumptions. The central bank has therefore two options. The first is to use the RCDC 
as the only guide to monetary policy while monitoring the rate of inflation. If it exceeded zero, the central bank 
would have overshot the rate of monetary expansion that is commensurate with the target of price stability. It, 
therefore, has to reduce monetary expansion, using the excess of inflation above zero as a guide. 
 
6 Financing speculators in the financial market is considered as some sort of a Ponzi scheme (Keen, 2011). 
In reverse, if the rate of inflation drops below zero, a similar but upward adjustment process would be required 
in monetary expansion. The hunch is that the RCDC would be a useful guide of monetary policy in the short run, 
which is the most relevant period for stability. 
Alternatively, the central bank can make its estimate of the real rate of growth, based on the RCDC. However, it 
has to keep monitoring the rate of inflation for fine-tuning. It appears a much easier task to rely solely on the 
RCDC, without attempting to estimate the rate of growth and while monitoring the rate of inflation, to be the 
better guide to monetary policy. 
Summary of the estimation method 
In an environment of highly subdued speculation, the difference between the real rate of growth and the RCDC 
would depend upon the state of expectations under uncertainty. Therefore, we can postulate that (real rate of 
growth, g − RCDC) would be a nonlinear function of the rates of growth of investment and consumption and the 
financial market trend, measured by the rate of growth of the general market index, as a proxy variable for short 
term expectations under uncertainty. The market index should include stocks and Sukuk. 
In other words: 
( )    ,  , g RCDC f I S θ− =                                    (Equation 1) 
Where: 
• I  is the rate of growth of an investment. 
• S  is the rate of growth of consumption. 
• θ is the rate of growth of the financial market general price index. 
• The estimated real rate of growth (g) for the current RCDC is used as an anchor 
to monetary policy. 
• Monetary expansion would be equated to (g), 
While monitoring the rate of inflation, 
If inflation > zero, reduce the rate of monetary expansion; if inflation < zero, increase 
the rate of monetary expansion. 
Table 1.1 Monetary survey in an Islamic economy 
 
 
MONETARY SURVEY IN AN ISLAMIC ECONOMY 
ASSETS LIABILITIES 
CASH IN VAULT 
NET FOREIGN ASSETS 
DOMESTIC LIQUIDITY 
Finance to households & businesses 
Finance to central & local governments 
Finance to non-banking financial institutions 
Central Deposit Certificates 
 
Money 
Money in Circulation 
Demand Deposits 
Investment Accounts 
Households investment accounts 
Business Sector 
Investment Accounts 
Central Deposits 
 
Through this process, the central bank may realize that it should change the rate of monetary expansion. If the 
desired change in the money supply is large, a change in the volume of CDs would be in order. If the change is not 
so large, the money supply can be fine-tuned through open market operations in CDCs (table 1.1). 
Monetary management in mixed systems 
In the case of mixed-finance systems, where Islamic and conventional finance are practiced side by side, the 
management of the money supply would be more complicated, unless the financial market authority prohibits 
financing speculation, and particularly through trading at the margin. Furthermore, Islamic banks must be 
prohibited from financing the purchase of stocks and other financial instruments for short-term acquisition. This 
step of financial reform would facilitate monetary management a great deal. Otherwise, the central bank's use of 
the RCDC to estimate an approximation of the real rate of growth would result in a distant approximation. Gauging 
monetary expansion to a distant approximation of the real rate of growth would not help approach price stability7. 
If the prohibition of financing speculation were not an available option, the CDC market would become a part of 
the financial markets’ gambling casino. CDC prices and rates of return would not be useful in calculating a good 
approximation of the rate of growth. As disequilibrium prices, they would stand at a much larger and less certain 
distance of their (presumed but imaginary) equilibrium level. 
 
7 in the case of a mixed system, the regulator needs to enforce standards for Shari'ah compliant shares, Sukuk and funds, in 
order to facilitate investment carried out by Islamic banks. The importance of regulation and supervision of Islamic finance 
assumes a much greater importance. The regulator cannot use the same regulatory and supervisory rules to both types of 
Islamic and conventional institutions. 
In such a case, the monetary authority must decide whether to continue using its monetary management 
approach, particularly inflation targeting, or move to a higher and perhaps easier level of monetary management 
under the rules of Islamic finance. 
How finance is allocated 
Under Islamic finance, money would be used by banks to provide financing of economic activities (public and 
private investment and private consumption) carried out by the government, firms, and the public. Financing 
would be provided in three major categories: permanent and/or diminishing partnership in profit and product 
(several forms of Musharaka)8 fixed or diminishing, restricted and unrestricted profit and loss sharing, or PLS 
(Mudaraba), restricted and unrestricted investment agency, or Wakala, deferred-payment sale finance (Bai’ 
Bethaman Ajel and Murabaha), and deferred delivery sale finance (Salam and Istisna’). 
There are many regulatory rules and safeguards that the monetary authority must put into force to ensure that 
Islamic finance is properly working within its paradigm (Al-Jarhi, 2016). To ensure proper allocation of finance, the 
central bank is advised to apply the rules listed in the appendix. 
Government budget finance 
In this macroeconomic model, the government is barred from using borrowing from the central bank to finance 
its budget deficits. Its activities can be divided into two main categories. The first is its pure public goods, which 
cannot be subject to the exclusion principle9. For this category of goods, the government must use the political 
process through which it can obtain tax revenues to finance its production. The second category is quasi-public 
goods. Their production and distribution can be designed to be amenable to the exclusion principle. Examples 
include speedways, bridges, water passages, and the like. They can be designed with turnpikes or gates to exclude 
non-payers. They can therefore be financed through offering bids through build, operate, and transfer (BOT). The 
government itself or bid-winners can apply for financing for such ventures through Islamic banks. In either case, 
banks must decide such cases based on feasibility alone. 
Instead of borrowing from the central bank, the government will gain a significant amount of seigniorage. All the 
money supply (a minimum of 25 percent of GDP) is being placed as investment accounts with Islamic banks. The 
rate of return on such accounts should exceed the rate of interest, like it on real investment, not conventional 
loans. Besides, the central bank will earn a commission on CDCs. Such income would be credited to the central 
bank and consequently will flow into the government budget. Furthermore, this investment income has an 
element of being countercyclical. When the central bank expands the money supply in the face of an economic 
decline, monetary expansion necessarily means more investment and more government income, which can be 
used in the fiscal expansion. The ultimate result is that in this model is that both monetary and fiscal policies are 
effectively tied together. 
 
8 Musharaka, Muzara’a, Mugharassa, and Mussaqah. 
9 The exclusion principle is to make commodities available only to those who pay their prices. Others would be excluded. 
There would be no chance for taking a free ride. This can be done with private goods and semi-public goods. Pure public 
goods, once provided, become available to all, and none can be excluded. They must therefore be financed through taxation. 
Islamic finance is also amenable to crowdfunding. The government can finance some of its social services through 
Sukuk (equity-based financial instruments), which, when properly structured, can be effective in mobilizing large 
amounts of resources to finance economic activities10. 
Awqaf and public services 
Public services, like health, education, garbage collection, and recycling, sustainable energy, as well as many other 
types can be at least partially provided through Awqaf11. Such public services can be financed through waqf funds. 
Such funds can be placed with banks as investment accounts whose earnings are earmarked for a particular use. 
They can also be used to finance income-earning assets whose returns can be perpetually earmarked to support 
certain activities. This latter method would be more effective if direct investment brings in higher returns than 
investment accounts with banks. Similar arrangements can be developed to provide students’ scholarships, 
teachers’ supplementary salaries, support of research institutions, and so on. 
In other words, Awqaf can be used at the widest possible scale to provide a good share, if not all of the public 
services to relieve the government and, consequently, taxpayers from financial burden. A decided advantage of 
finance through Awqaf is that it could provide for the independence of educators and researchers from 
government and business influence. Such arrangements can be extended to institutions that require 
independence, like the judiciary, the election supervisory institutions, and so on. 
Zakah and public services 
Based on economic reasoning, equity or social justice is a valuable social service. Economic reasoning is based on 
labor productivity. One of the reasons for poverty is that the poor may have lower productivity on the account of 
the lack of human capital (in the form of education and training) as well as the lack of physical productive assets. 
Once both elements are provided, the poor become more productive. National GDP, employment, and growth 
would be positively influenced. Therefore, equity, in the form of narrower wealth and income differences, leads 
to improvements in productivity, which in turn would assist in economic development12. 
From an Islamic vantage point, all citizens must be capable of fulfilling their basic needs, including food, clothing, 
and shelter, as a minimum. When the society is sufficiently rich, merit wants must also be added, like education, 
transport, communications, marriage, and employment. If we excluded the level of income that is sufficient to 
provide for basic needs as well as merit wants13 any income or wealth over and above such level must be subjected 
 
10 The relative effectiveness of Sukuk in resource mobilization is directly related to being common undivided shares in income 
earning assets, not in debt. They can earn higher rates of return that would attract investors of all types. 
11 At certain periods of Muslim history, Awqaf covered all education and health services provided. This important innovation 
of the Islamic economic system has been copied in other cultures in the form of “public foundations.” 
12 This point runs against the neoclassical assertion of the existence of a trade-off between equity and efficiency. 
13 This level is an interpretation of the concept of Nissab. Some prefer to use its measure in grams of gold used at the time of 
the Prophet. Others prefer to define it by the cost of obtaining basic needs and merit wants, which would vary from time to 
time and from society to society. 
to a levy called al-Zakah. Zakah is levied on all assets and/or their returns (rental, profit, etc.). Some prefer to 
narrow down the list of zakatable assets, but we prefer to join those who make it all-inclusive. 
Zakah is earmarked for certain uses, the most important of which is redistribution aiming at enriching the poor. 
Enrichment here is taken to mean that the poor become capable of covering their basic needs and merit wants 
during their lifetime. Such a redistributive process must be conducted yearly to reach wealth (human and physical) 
maintenance for the poor, that is, a level of wealth that is sufficient to produce an income to cover both basic 
needs and merit wants. 
The ideal method which we have repeatedly proposed is to make Islamic banks custodians of collected Zakah and 
allow them to invest the same temporarily until they are used. Meanwhile, Islamic banks would use such proceeds 
to establish microprojects whose titles would be transferred to the qualified poor. Each project would produce 
enough income to support the needs and wants of a poor household. Meanwhile, since this process of 
redistribution would be time-consuming, the poor would be provided income maintenance until each family 
possesses a suitable microproject of its own. Title transfer would also include education and training to make the 
household capable of managing their project. The sale of projects after their possession by the poor should be 
restricted and closely monitored to make sure that such a sale would not return them to poverty. 
Financial markets 
Conventional financial markets have failed to some extent to provide sufficient fund mobilization for economic 
development. They have mostly turned into gambling casinos with an open gate too hot money that has been a 
source of instability and contagion. The reason behind this gambling tendency is the gambling contracts that allow 
for transactions based on fictitious sales and betting on future prices as well as interest rates. It was pointed out 
by some that the common use of such contracts was an important element behind the latest Great Recession of 
2007–2012 (Keen, 2011). However, no country so far has come forward to make their use illegal. 
Since such contracts are strictly prohibited under the system of Islamic finance, financial markets would be a good 
candidate to play an important role in mobilizing resources for growing economic activities. However, care must 
be taken to prevent the financing of short-term trading in the financial market. This would serve as a backdoor for 
gambling activities. 
Provided that such safeguards are effectively implemented, an Islamic financial market would become an effective 
tool for resource-mobilization for investment. Financial instruments that would be available include corporate 
shares, fund shares, and Sukuk. Moreover, Islamic banks may issue their certificates of investment accounts to 
circulate together with CDs. They would all be equity-based, that is, giving their holders common undivided shares 
in firms or assets. 
The formation of such markets would not come automatically, especially when moving from conventional to 
Islamic finance systems. The financial market authority must start by allowing each financial market in the country 
to start an Islamic financial market in which all instruments would conform to the rules of Islamic finance. It should 
follow this with setting standards for the shares, Sukuk, funds, and hedging that must be followed before allowing 
such instruments to be listed in an Islamic market as an Islamic financial instrument. Gradually, some Islamic 
financial markets would become able to function side by side with conventional financial markets. This would 
facilitate subjecting all financial markets to the rules of Islamic finance. 
Monetary policy 
Once the Islamic finance part of the monetary and financial system is established, the central bank can exercise 
Islamic monetary policies with vigor. The total supply of money would be augmented or reduced by adding to or 
subtracting from CDs. The fine-tuning of the rate of monetary expansion can easily be accomplished by open 
market operations in CDCs. 
A question arises regarding monetary policy in a mixed economic system. Let us assume that a country starts with 
a fully conventional monetary and financial system. As commonly practiced, some Islamic banks and non-banking 
financial institutions may be in operation, but they are uninvolved in monetary policy. To have a viable Islamic 
finance sector, we suggest the following: 
1 The practices of Islamic banks in operations must be streamlined to remove all finance products that 
camouflage interest-based finance, like Tawarruq, debt trading, international Murabahas, and risk trading. This 
would lead to a significant increase in Islamic banks’ profitability, raising the profits distributed to the holders of 
investment accounts. There would be a gradual shift of funds from conventional to Islamic banks. 
2 All Islamic finance windows would be considered as a first step to move from 
conventional to Islamic finance within a certain number of years. Then all branches 
would be closed as they are replaced by full-fledged Islamic banks. 
3 Holders of investment accounts in Islamic banks must be treated as shareholders. They should be allowed 
to take a share in management that is commensurate with their share in the resources invested by the bank. That 
would lead to a new type of banking institution that is predominantly managed by investment account holders. It 
would also remove the information asymmetry associated with the Mudaraba contract, upon which investment 
accounts are based. 
4 A percentage of the money supply equal to the market share of the Islamic banking assets in total assets 
can be placed as CDs with Islamic banks. The percentage would be adjusted with the change in the market share 
of Islamic finance. Similarly, the remaining part of the money stock can be placed as time deposits in conventional 
banks can be subject to the same rules under conventional monetary systems. Such a procedure would go hand 
in hand with the application of the system of total reserves Islamic investment accounts as well as demand 
deposits in Islamic banks. 
5 The system of total reserves would be introduced gradually, raising the required reserve ratio while 
increasing CDs with Islamic banks and central bank time deposits with conventional banks. 
6 CDs would grow at the expense of conventional demand and time deposits with conventional banks. The 
use of CDs and CDCs would become increasingly more influential in monetary policy. 
7 Within a period of two to four years, Islamic banks should dominate the scene, 
and monetary policy would depend more exclusively on CDs and open market 
operations in CDCs. the economy would start enjoying a higher level of price stability 
and higher growth. Investment account holders would enjoy rates of profits that are 
comparable with the rates of return on equity, after adjusting for the risk differential. 
Development policies 
Once the Islamic monetary and financial system is established, the central bank finds itself with much more 
economic influence than is usually perceived for central banks. First, it would have much more power in controlling 
the money supply, with the application of total reserves. Second, it has the power to allocate a good part of the 
financial resources (the total money supply) for banks towards investment. This opens the door for designing and 
implementing an investment policy by the central bank, which would ultimately become a policy for economic 
development. 
The central bank, jointly with the relevant ministry (of economy, treasury, planning, etc.) can set some 
development priorities concerning the sectors and regions to be targeted for higher rates of investment. The profit 
share, which should be clearly defined in the investment-account contract, can be subject to central bank control 
as a policy variable. Restricted PLS deposits can be allowed with higher profit shares to customers to encourage 
the financing of certain types of investments and in certain types of sectors or geographic locations. The profit 
share can be one of the tools of influencing the size of credit money in the economy being directed sectorally or 
geographically. The central bank is well advised to gauge and monitor profit shares without directly interfering in 
the investment process. 
Fiscal policy 
Fiscal policy would focus on reducing the tax burden through good governance and supervising the institutions of 
Zakah and Awqaf to ensure their viability in bearing a good share of providing public services and establishing the 
equitable distribution of wealth. Furthermore, the government should adjust its spending activities to the changes 
in seigniorage resulting from countercyclical monetary expansion or contraction. This would keep both fiscal and 
monetary policies highly coordinated. 
Trade and exchange policies 
Once the Islamic finance program is implemented, the economy will have a rate of inflation that will narrowly 
oscillate around zero. This would place the currency of the country at an impeccable position vis-à-vis other 
currencies. The stability of the exchange rate attracts more investment, especially through shares, fund shares, 
and Sukuk. The country would enjoy a significant improvement in trade competitiveness. The country would also 
enjoy investment inflows that would be an additional factor in strengthening its currency and improving its current 
account balance. 
As a result, international financial flows would take place through the equity, not the lending, path. The debt 
problem would disappear. Investment flows would seek an outlet of a longer-term than those sought by hot 
money, which usually seeks the purchase of debt instruments. Instability and contagion through the financial 
markets become a thing of the past. 
Dealing with crises 
Will our economy after reform become an ideal economy in the neoclassical sense, meaning that it would enjoy 
a stable equilibrium with no crises? Of course not. The neoclassical utopia does not exist. The economy will have 
prices moving towards ever-changing equilibria but never reaching equilibrium. Crises can happen, either because 
of policy errors, laxity in the application of rules, natural disasters, or imported shocks, especially if an economy is 
modest in size with great interdependencies with several trading partners. 
However, when an economic crisis takes place, policies to confront it should be 
radically different from the policies used to confront, for example, the last Great 
Recession. 
Let us assume some form of a crisis and see how it would be dealt with. If a large group of farmers obtains financing 
to build their homes through Ijarah Muntahia Bettamleek, their leased homes are securitized by Ijarah Sukuk, 
through which Sukuk holders own the leased part of the homes (which is declining over time) and get paid their 
share of the principal and the rent. Sukuk are also traded in the financial market. 
The onset of the crisis could be a crop failure. Farmers find themselves unable to pay their Ijarah installments. 
Sukuk holders will get no lease payments. If all behaved like the American administration during the International 
Financial Crisis, homeowners would be kicked out of their homes and declared bankrupt. The part they own of 
their houses would be sold under duress for negligible prices. Sukuk values would decline to almost nothing. 
Farmers would not be able to purchase their basic needs. Aggregate demand would significantly decline, and the 
economy would enter into a recession. 
The government would allocate huge amounts of taxpayers’ money to bail out banks 
to prevent a bank run. Banks get more resources but avoid lending, which perpetuates 
the crises getting worse over time. They instead place their money in government debt 
instruments. 
In an Islamic economic system, the handling of the crisis is very different. First, homeowners, as debtors suffering 
from temporary insolvency, receive from banks free rescheduling with no increase in their debt. The central banks 
increase the volume of their CDs with banks to allow them to provide rescheduling while keeping their volume of 
investment growth. Since farmers will not be bankrupt and will obtain free rescheduling, they can obtain bridge 
assistance from Zakah and Awqaf institutions to maintain their purchases of necessities. They can also obtain 
financing for cultivating their next crop from banks. In total, aggregate demand will not significantly decline, and 
hence there is no reason for a recession. 
Sukuk holders may not be able to get the same level of payments on their Sukuk, but they are assured of continued 
payments in the future, as farmers’ finances are still sound. There would be no sudden dip in Sukuk prices. Sukuk 
prices will suffer only to the extent that this year’s payments are partly reduced and partly pushed forward to the 
following periods. 
Most importantly, no taxpayers’ money would be spent to bail out banks. Meanwhile, no bank failure would be 
recorded. 
How can we make use of Islamic macroeconomics? 
An Islamic macroeconomic arrangement can push an emergent economy to a take-off stage where growth would 
reach unprecedented levels. To apply the macroeconomic model, a country can take the following steps that 
gradually add an Islamic macroeconomic structure to its economy, with all the expected benefits. The steps are 
ordered in a time sequence as a game plan. 
1 Streamlining the Islamic finance sector through the following steps: 
1.1 Issue an Islamic-finance product handbook and establish a training program for the employees of 
participating banks to learn the subtle secrets of Islamic finance and how to implement it. 
1.2 Adjust the banking law to include specific rules that enable participating banks to operate at a higher level 
of compliance and to improve their governance process. 
1.3 Convene a meeting of entrepreneurs, Islamic bankers, and some academicians to discuss how businesses 
and participating banks can cooperate to improve the Islamic finance sector on the one hand and provide more 
resources to businesses on the other. 
2 Set new rules for participating in banking windows and branches to make them a temporary step towards 
full-fledged Islamic banking. 
3 Adjust the rules regarding governance to allow for more involvement of investment account holders and 
better Shari’ah governance. 
4 Start to implement the system of total reserves gradually, perhaps within 2–5 years. As the required 
reserve ratio is raised, the central bank would provide more time deposits to conventional banks and CDs to 
participating banks. 
5 Establish Awqaf funds whose proceeds would be invested in participating banks until they are placed into 
suitable industrial, agricultural, or commercial investments. Income gained from investing would be directed for 
the following purposes: 
5.1 An education waqf to spend on the education sector, to include all the young in elementary and high 
school education and all high school graduates into university education. Also, the waqf would encourage 
specializations that are lacking in some economic sectors. The waqf would also finance basic research in strategic 
fields with the cooperation of the business sector. 
5.2 A health waqf to spend on improving and augmenting health services in all hospitals, with donations to 
improve hospital equipment and provide supplementary salaries and financial incentives to professors in medical 
schools and doctors in hospitals. 
5.3 An infrastructure waqf that supports developing water resources, planting the barren parts of the land 
with fruit and timber trees, establishing energy production from sustainable sources like solar energy, improving 
the transportation network, and modernizing the communication network. 
6 Any reduction in government expenditures that results from using these waqf funds should be used to 
reduce the tax burden on the poor. 
7 Establishment of two Zakah funds, one to be spent on making microprojects whose titles would be 
transferred to the qualifying poor, with a view towards their wealth maintenance. The other would be used for 
income maintenance of the qualifying poor until they can have a title to a microproject. 
8 Establish an Islamic financial market in Bursa Istanbul with standards for shares, Sukuk, and funds, and 
relevant listing and trading rules. 
9 Establish Sukuk funds for the following purposes: 
9.1 Finance of agricultural cropping, produce distribution locally, and exports of produce. This would include 
the development of animal wealth and the promotion of meat, poultry, and fish production, and trade. 
9.2 Finance of industrial projects, especially those that have higher technology content, like electronics, 
computers, and mobile phones. 
9.3 Finance of domestic and international trade. 
9.4 Provide extra finance to firms to enable each to substitute their domestic and international debt with 
domestic Islamic finance. 
9.5 All Sukuk would be marketed at the retail level so that individuals can purchase and hold Sukuk easily. 
Moreover, they should be marketed domestically and internationally. Sukuk funds would be established to 
provide investors with bundles of Sukuk with more variety in combinations of return and risk. 
10 Start apportioning the money supply as time deposits and investment deposits in conventional and Islamic 
banks, respectively. 
11 Once Islamic finance reaches 25 percent of the total financial assets, monetary policy based on CDs, CDCs, 
and absolute price stability should be gradually introduced. 
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Appendix 
Regulatory rules for finance 
The use of these finance contracts or modes is subject to the following (regulatory) rules: 
• Contracts can be mixed and matched to form financial products that fulfill the banks’ business objectives 
of return and safety and customers’ objectives of finance requirements. 
• Contracts are well defined. They cannot be mixed and matched to provide ruses to camouflage selling 
present for future money or interest-based finance, as in the cases of ‘Eina sale and Tawarruq. Unlawful products 
must be included in the bank regulations to ensure enforcement. 
• In the cases of PLS finance, safeguards must be provided to reduce information asymmetry including 
mixing with Musharaka and placing the burden of proof on the Mudareb, requiring good bookkeeping and 
feasibility studies. 
• Islamic banks must be equipped with capabilities to make and review feasibility studies and participate in 
the management of the firms they finance. 
• The central bank must ensure balanced use of finance modes. If left alone, Islamic banks would focus on 
Murabaha, because of its close but incomplete similarity with the classical loan contract. It is also amenable to 
ruses that allow for mimicking conventional finance through the use of agency (Wakala) contract. 
• Debt sale must be prohibited, except at its nominal value. 
• Pure risk trading must be prohibited. No finance should be provided to financial market speculation, 
sometimes named as Ponzi schemes (Keen, 2011)14. 
Appendix End Here 
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